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RASER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., by and through ) 
Houston Phoenix Group, LLC as its Attorney-in- ) 
Fact; THOMAS COLLENTINE, JR., JUDITH ) 
COLLENTINE, CHARLES FAIRES, SANDRA ) 
FAIRES, STEPHEN E. HART, LORI F. HART, ) 
ALAN S. LISENBY, WILLIAM McALA V ANY, ) 
JOANN McALA V ANY, EUGENE TIFFIN, ) 
TIFFIN, INC., ROBERT BAIR, JEFFREY ) 
ESFELD, MICHAEL ESFELD, SIGRID ESFELD, ) 
JAMES BAKER, JR., ROBERT BAKER, ) 
RICHARD HASKELL, SUSAN S. HASKELL, ) 
WILLIAM BURNSIDE, ROBERT KORNFELD, ) 
RICHARD BURHMAN, as Trustee of the ) 
Charitable Remainder Unit rust Agreement of ) 
Wesley W. Cash, Sr., JANE MAJ, RONALD G. ) 
MAY, DONNA CASH, as Executor of the Estate of ) 
Dorthy Connelly, JUDy MUNZI, MARK ) 
SANSOM, GARY SCHUSTER, CHESTER ) 
SCOTT, JOHN SCOTT, PHILLIPS W. SMITH, ) 
KELL Y TRIMBLE, OCEAN FUND, LLC, ) 
WARNER INVESTMENTS, LLC, MAASSI, INC., ) 
RONALD WINCHELL, JOAN W. WINCHELL, as ) 
Trustee of Winchell Nonexempt Terminable Trust, ) 
DOUG WIVIOTT, and MARCIA WIVIOTT, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
MORGAN STANLEY & CO., LLC, GOLDMAN ) 
SACHS & CO., LP, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, ) 
FENNER & SMITH, INC., UBS SECURITIES, ) 
LLC, AND [ABC CORPORATIONS], ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
FEB 262014 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA 
Civil Action File No. 
2012CV214140 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Upon consideration of the briefs on the motions and the 
record of the case, this Court finds as follows: 
Plaintiffs' allege that Defendants Morgan Stanley & Co., Goldman Sachs & Co., Men-ill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and UBS Securities, LLC manipulated the price of Plaintiff 
Raser Technologies, Inc. ("Raser") common stock by engaging in "naked" short sales, which 
refers to the failure of a trader to borrow or arrange to borrow a security within the requisite time 
frame following a short sale. See Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Management, 
LLC, 305 Ga. App. 283, 287 n. 8 (2010) 
Raser had its stock delisted from the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") on November 
3, 2010, and subsequently filed for bankruptcy in April 2011, when its stock price fell below $1 
per share. Twenty-nine Plaintiffs are individuals who allegedly purchased and sold Raser stock 
between 2003 and 2011. Eleven Plaintiffs are Georgia residents. The Plaintiffs argue that 
Defendants' conduct resulted in counterfeit shares that allegedly depressed the price of Raser 
stock between 2003 and 2011. 
On April 20, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this action, asserting claims against Defendants for 
Violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO") Act; 
Violation of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, repealed, and the Georgia Securities Act of 
2008; Violation of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act; Money Had and Received; 
and Civil Conspiracy. 
On July 11,2013, this Court entered the Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (the 
"Order"), dismissing the following claims with prejudice: 1) Plaintiffs' securities claims 
premised on the 1973 Act; 2) Plaintiffs' claims for the sale of unregistered securities; 3) 
Plaintiffs' claims based on the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act; 4) Plaintiffs' claims 
1 Pursuant to the Consent Order Dismissing Certain Claims of Plaintiff Raser Technologies, Inc. entered on January 
23,2013, Raser's claims against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. stand dismissed. 
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for money had and received; 5) Plaintiffs' claims under Georgia RICO predicated on theft by 
taking/theft by deception and the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act; and 6) Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs' claims for civil conspiracy. Finding that the doctrine of lex loci delecti 
governed Plaintiffs' statutory claims, the Court ruled that the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs were 
permitted to re-plead securities and RICO claims based on the laws of their respective home 
states. 
On August 19, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Amendments to First Amended Complaint 
("Amended Complaint"), asserting Georgia-based racketeering claims by Plaintiffs who resided 
in Tennessee, New York, South Carolina, Illinois, Arizona, Washington, Utah, Florida and Ohio. 
The Amended Complaint also asserts claims based on Nevada's racketeering statute, are-plead 
claim for civil conspiracy, and punitive damages. 
Along with the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration: 1) 
Asking the Court to modify its Order to confirm that it was not foreclosing Plaintiffs' right to 
plead the public policy exception of the lex loci delicti choice of law rule; and 2) Seeking the 
Court's reconsideration of its ruling dismissing the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' conspiracy and 
Georgia RICO claims. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended 
Complaint to Add Plaintiffs from the States of Illinois and Colorado, seeking permission to add 
three additional plaintiffs from those states. Finally, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' Claims. Because the relief sought in Plaintiffs' motions is intertwined 
with the Court's ruling on Defendants' motion, the Court will first address Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. 
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1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' Claims 
"A motion to dismiss should only be granted if the allegations of the complaint, 
construed most favorably to the plaintiff, disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of provable facts. Stated somewhat differently, a motion to 
dismiss should not be granted unless the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly 
introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the 
reliefsought." Thomas v. Lee, 286 Ga. App. 860, 861 (2010). 
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs repackage Georgia RICO claims by pleading the 
public policy exception to lex loci delecti as applied to Non-Georgia Plaintiffs residing in 
Tennessee, New York, South Carolina, Illinois, Arizona, Washington, Utah, Florida and Ohio. 
Defendants move the Court to dismiss these claims, arguing, among other things, that Georgia 
lacks a public policy interest in the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' claims and that such an exercise of 
Georgia authority would offend the U.S. Constitution. 
"Under the rule of lex loci delicti, tort cases are governed by the substantive law of the 
state where the tOli was committed." Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Distrib. Co., 203 Ga. App. 763 
(1992). In the Order, the COUli determined that the lex loci delicti analysis rendered the Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs' claims subject to the laws of their home states. However, "[ e ]ven if an 
application of [lex loci delicti] renders the law of another state applicable, the forum, within 
constitutional limits, is not required to give the law of another state extra-territorial effect. That is 
only done as a matter of courtesy or comity, which will not be enforced if the law of the other 
state contravenes the public policy of the forum." Id. at 766. 
The Non-Georgia Plaintiffs argue that the application of Georgia law is mandated for 
certain Non-Georgia Plaintiffs because the state laws applicable to them significantly differ from 
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Georgia's statutory racketeering scheme and therefore, amount to violations of Georgia public 
policy. As an initial matter, before delving into any specific policy issues that may be triggered 
by the racketeering statutes of other states, the Court finds it appropriate to evaluate Georgia's 
interest in this dispute, both from a public policy perspective and in order to determine the 
constitutional limitations on the application of Georgia law. 
The Supreme Court visited the constitutional restrictions on a forum state's ability to 
apply its laws to extraterritorial claims in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
There, the Supreme Court considered whether Kansas law could constitutionally govern a class 
action involving claims made by a majority of non-Kansas residents concerning gas leases that 
had little connection to Kansas. Concluding that Kansas law would violate the due process and 
full faith and credit clause, the Supreme Court explained that the forum state must have 
"significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member 
of the plaintiff class, contacts creating state interests, in order to ensure that the choice of the 
forum's law is not arbitrary or unfair." Id., at 821-822. 
Here, the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs ask this COUl1 to find, for purposes of making the public 
policy exception to the rule of lex loci delicti, that Georgia has "a substantial interest in 
regulating the conduct in the claims asserted." See Amended Complaint. As support, Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs direct the COUl1 to consider allegations of Defendants' conduct that allegedly 
took place in Georgia. As alleged, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants engaged in the following 
activities in Georgia: 
• Unlawful naked short sale transactions were initiated in Georgia or were undertaken on 
behalf of Georgia residents; 
• On information and belief, artificial and/or phantom Raser shares were bought, sold or 
delivered in Georgia; 
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• Defendants sent money to or received money from Georgia in connection with the 
purchase, sale, loan or other transfer of Raser stock; 
• Documents relating to Raser were sent to or received from Georgia; and 
• Many of the Defendants' Atlanta, Georgia offices were involved in the purchase, sale 
loan or borrowing of Raser stock. 
Additionally, each Defendant is alleged to have: 
• Maintained an office in Georgia; 
• Conducted business in Georgia; 
• Purchased or sold Raser common stock from a person in Georgia; 
• Borrowed Raser C01mnon stock from a person in Georgia; 
• Sent or received correspondence regarding Raser stock or options from its Atlanta, 
Georgia office; 
• Requested facilitated or engaged in short sales of Raser common stock from its Atlanta, 
Georgia office; 
• Sent or received information pertaining to a Sh01i sale of Raser common stock from its 
Atlanta, Georgia office; 
• Received fees, commissions, interest or other monies from a person in Georgia in 
connection with the purchase or sale of Raser common stock; 
• Purchased or sold Raser common stock from its Atlanta, Georgia office; 
• Wired or otherwise electronically transferred money to Georgia relating to the purchase, 
sale, loan or borrowing of Raser common stock or options; 
• Received a wire or other electronic transfer of money from Georgia relating to the 
purchase, sale, loan or bon-owing of Raser common stock or options; and 
• Borrowed Raser stock from a person in Georgia. 
In contrast to a personal jurisdiction analysis, which requires a finding that a particular 
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, I-Iyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge 
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Capital Management, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 283 (2010), due process requires that a forum state 
have a significant relationship with the claims. See Kirkpatrick v. I.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 
718 (11 til Cir. 1987) ("[T]he law of Georgia could be applied consistent with due process only if 
the particular transaction had some significant relation to Georgia."). While Plaintiffs' 
allegations establish a relationship to Georgia and support Georgia's connection to claims 
brought by Georgia residents, the COUli is unable to ascertain a significant constellation of 
activity in Georgia, unique to the claims of the individual Non-Georgia Plaintiffs, to satisfy the 
Supreme Court's mandate in Shutts. 
To establish a sufficient state interest, Shutts requires that a state have "significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member of the 
plaintiff class." Id. at 821-822 (emphasis added). The Court interprets this to require each Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffto allege a specific and independent connection to Georgia, rather than piggy- 
back on generalized allegations of harm suffered by Georgia Plaintiffs or cite to unrelated 
contacts Defendants happen to maintain to Georgia. Non-Georgia Plaintiffs have failed to make 
such a showing. In any event, the COUli is not persuaded that Georgia's interest in the Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs' claims warrants the imposition of the policy exception to the lex loci delicti 
analysis. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the Non-Georgia Defendants' 
Georgia RICO claims. To the extent a racketeering claim is available under the law of the Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs' forum state, the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs may re-plead within a reasonable 
amount of time. 
Tuming to Defendants' next argument, Defendants contend that the Nevada Plaintiffs 
fail to satisfy the pleading standard required to maintain a RICO claim under Nevada law. While 
it is true that Nevada courts have directed RICO claimants to plead RICO violations with "the 
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same degree of specificity called for as in a criminal indictment ," see Hale v. Burkhardt, 104 
Nev. 632, 638 (1988), courts also recognize that a balance must be struck "between providing 
adequate notice to the adverse party while at the same time not effectively requiring pre- 
discovery." G.K. Las Vegas Limited Partnership v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 460 F.Supp.2d 
1222 (D. Nev. 2006). 
The Nevada Plaintiffs' RICO claim is premised, in part, on NRS § 90.570, which 
prohibits a person in connection with the "offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase or purchase" of a 
security, directly or indirectly, to "(1) [e]mploy any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) 
[m Jake an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made not misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they are 
made; or (3) [e ]ngage in an act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon a person." 
Here, by pleading that the Defendants have "created false documentation regarding their 
trading, loaning and ownership of Raser stock by creating mismarked order tickets to make 
transactions appear as long sales when, in fact, they are short sales;" "submit[ ed] fake short 
interest and other reports to regulators;" and "falsely represent[ ed] that they either possessed the 
borrowed securities or had located them for bon-owing and delivery," the Court finds that the 
Nevada Plaintiffs have specified sufficient grounds on which to raise an inference of fraud. See 
Rocker v. KPMG LLP, 122 Nev. 1185, 1187 (2006) (reversed on other grounds). Accordingly, 
because the Court concludes that the facts necessary for appellants to plead with greater 
particularity are peculiarly within Defendants' knowledge, "the plaintiff should have all 
opportunity to conduct discovery and amend his complaint to include the particular facts." 
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Rocker, 122 Nev. at 1187. The Court also finds sufficient the Nevada Plaintiffs' allegations of 
the enterprise and proximate cause elements of the RICO claims. Accordingly, Defendants' 
motion is DENIED on those grounds. 
As to the Nevada Plaintiffs' RICO claims premised on violations of federal securities law 
and NRS § 90-580, the Court accepts Defendants' challenge that these statutes cannot form 
predicate acts under NRS § 207.360, as neither is specifically listed as a "crime related to 
racketeering." Defendants' motion is GRANTED to the extent the Nevada Plaintiffs' RICO 
claim relies on those predicate acts. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's July 11,2013 Order 
Dismissing the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' RICO and Conspiracy Claims 
Plaintiffs ask the COUli to reconsider its July 11, 2013 Order (the "Order") to clarify that 
Plaintiffs are permitted to make allegations in the Amendments to First Amended Complaint that 
the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti doctrine requires application of Georgia law, 
rather than the law of certain Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' home states. 
As set forth above, the Court has addressed on the merits the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' 
allegations regarding the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti doctrine. Accordingly, 
because the COUli has found that Georgia lacks a sufficient interest in the Non-Georgia 
Plaintiffs' claims to invoke Georgia public policy without offending the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion as moot. The Court further declines to reconsider the Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs' argument that Georgia's RICO statute is intended to provide a remedy to the 
Non-Georgia Plaintiffs due to allegations that Defendants' engaged in a pattern of racketeering 
in Georgia. For the reasons set forth in the Order, this argument lacks the weight of authority 
and would undermine Georgia's choice of law jurisprudence. 
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Finally, the Court stands by its analysis of Brenner v. Future Graphics, LLC, 258 F.R.D. 
561 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Plaintiffs point out that Georgia law governs the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' 
claims for civil conspiracy. See Brenner, at 571 ("Georgia's choice oflaw system, however, has 
an unusual characteristic: the application of another jurisdiction'S laws is limited to statutes and 
decisions construing those statutes. When no statute is involved, Georgia courts apply the 
common law as developed in Georgia rather than foreign case law."). The Court agrees. 
However, to plead a conspiracy claim under Georgia law, the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs must allege 
that "two or more persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort." Id. 
Because the Court found that the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs did not have an actionable Georgia 
RICO claim, the COUli ruled that their conspiracy claim fails due to the inability to satisfy the 
elements of a conspiracy claim under Georgia law. The Brelmer decision does not compel the 
Court to adopt the approach that Plaintiffs suggest, even if the Court was able to extract by 
implication the Brenner Court's support of a civil conspiracy claim premised on Georgia RICO 
violations. In any event, the Brenner Court was not sitting in a motion to dismiss posture. 
Therefore, in contrast to this case, the Georgia RICO claims alleged in Brenner were still in play 
and could serve as a "tort" necessary to satisfy the elements of a conspiracy claim under Georgia 
law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended Complaint to Add 
Plaintiffs from the States of Illinois and Colorado 
Plaintiffs seek leave of court to add two additional plaintiffs from Illinois to Count Nine 
of the First Amended Complaint and to add an additional claim under Colorado's racketeering 
statute by one additional plaintiff from Colorado. Considering the Court's ruling above 
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dismissing the Georgia RICO claims asserted by Illinois Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' request is DENIED 
with respect to the proposed additional Illinois plaintiffs. 
With regard to the amendment concerning the Colorado claim, Defendants oppose this 
request, arguing that it is untimely and futile because the statute of limitations has lapsed and the 
claim otherwise fails on the merits. 
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15, "[wjhenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth 
in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading" for 
statute of limitations purposes. Defendants argue that the relation back doctrine can not be 
invoked by "strangers to the action." See Beaver v. Steinichen, 182 Ga. App. 303 (1987). 
However, the COUli finds Defendants' authority unavailing. In Beaver v. Steinichen, the plaintiff 
attempted to add new defendants past the expiration of the statute of limitations. In contrast, the 
issue currently before the Court is the addition of a plaintiff, and such request is adjudicated with 
a lighter hand pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c). The Court finds no compelling reason under 
Georgia law to deny Plaintiffs' request on this ground. 
Turning to Defendants' complaints regarding the timing of Plaintiffs' request, the COUli 
acknowledges that Plaintiffs' motion comes after the expiration for the filing of preliminary 
motions, including motions to add parties, under the Case Management Order. However, given 
the impact of the Court's rulings on Plaintiffs' theory of the case (the availability ofa cause of 
action under Georgia's RICO statute for non-Georgia Plaintiffs), the Court will exercise its 
discretion to sustain Plaintiffs' request to add the Colorado Plaintiff and will likewise entertain 
reasonable modifications to the Case Management Order to accommodate any extension 
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requested by Defendants. As to the substantive arguments in opposition to the addition of the 
Colorado Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to rebut the presumption in favor 
of Plaintiffs at the pleading stage. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED as to the 
addition of the Colorado Plaintiff. 
SO ORDERED this ;2.., It day of February, 2014. 
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